Comparative Book Review
of
The Tragedy of American Diplomacy by William Appleman Williams
and
America, Russia, and The Cold War by Walter LeFeber

 Nuclear test photo courtesy of The Cold War Museum at www.coldwar.org
Accessed Dec 1, 2002

    In keeping with my interest in the themes of American and Russian relations and the origins of the Cold War I have chosen to review the books The Tragedy of American Diplomacy by William Appleman Williams and America, Russia, and the Cold War by Walter LaFeber for my term paper.
     Williams book has a wide scope beginning in the nineteenth century up until 1957 and takes an in depth look at the open door policy adopted by the United States as the basis for its foreign policy, particularly how that policy affected the countries world outlook and actions during times of crisis.  LaFebers book on the other hand, analyzes the period in history from 1945 until 1996 focusing on US and Russian relations.  Due to the vast scale of the time period represented by these two works I have chosen to focus primarily on the sections in both that related particularly to the origins and escalation of the Cold War.
     LaFebers main thesis is that US domestic policy dictated its foreign policy.  He also suggests that President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson chose to demonize communism and overemphasize the threat that Russia posed in order to get large military bills through congress.
     Williams’s thesis is that the open door policy adopted by the US in the beginning of the twentieth century led to the formation of an informal colonial empire created not by the acquisition of colonial territories but by the strength and influence of American investments abroad.  Williams quotes President Warren G. Harding in illustration of this, “Operate aggressively and go on to the peaceful commercial conquest of the world” (Williams, 93).  Williams also says that the misuse and abuse of these colonial relationships paved the way for the later revolutionary wave that swept the globe.
     Williams points out that there was a broad consensus in the United States in favor of an expansionist foreign policy.  It was seen as viable means to ease existing difficulties and guard against further troubles.  However, in their desperate need for ever expanding markets US companies, “press[ed] loans on nations which had neither the existing means to repay them nor a cogent plan of development which would make it possible for them to do so” (Williams, 107).  Williams argues that this and other predatory business practices adopted by US companies either intentionally or unintentionally undermined the rights of these psuedo colonies of self-determination.  Eventually their reliance on US investment meant that many developing and even industrialized countries negated their own needs and best interests in a bid to retain the vital influx of cash that US companies provided.
    As the century developed America increasingly used its economic influence to dictate the policies of many independent governments.  One example used by Williams is the conditions the US placed on any aid given to Russia after World War Two.  Williams quotes former ambassador to the USSR William Averell Harriman, “Russia should be should be given to understand that our willingness to cooperate wholeheartedly with them in their vast reconstruction problems will depend upon their behavior in international matters,” (Williams, 159).  In contrast LaFeber, while seemingly in agreement places far less emphasis on the economic reasoning behind US decision making.
     Another main theme for Williams is that of manifest destiny.  This was a belief in the inherent right of US businesses to expand into foreign markets in order to survive.  Indeed Williams goes so far as to state that the US doctrine of capitalism carries with it an inherently expansionist ideology.  Without the continued creation and absorption of new foreign markets for US business then the US would have been unable to sustain its growth.  This takes the inflammatory anti-Russian rhetoric of George Frost Kennans theory of containment and applies the same charge to the United States itself.


Image courtesy of The Cold War Museum online at www.coldwar.org
 accessed Dec 1, 2002
     LaFeber also discusses manifest destiny but his thesis differs from that of Williams in that he argues that both Russia and the US had political agendas based in this tradition.  Russia, according to LaFeber, saw their Czar as a divine instrument and as such it was his right to expand ease across Asia in the eighteen hundreds while the US expanded westwards believing it too was a divine mission.  LaFeber states that no conflict occurred until the late eighteen hundreds in Manchuria because Russia had until that point always ceded to US claims, “Whenever conflicts arose […] the Russians retreated before the demands of US expansionists,” (Lafeber, 1).  Inherent in LaFebers argument is the notion that as time passed the US remained the contentious one of the two nations.
     It can be argued that Russia’s actions in Eastern Europe post World War Two were based in no small measure on creating a buffer zone between itself and further involvement in European wars.  Russia had suffered tremendous losses and was patently unwilling, especially economically, to countenance another war.  Williams apparently agrees with this argument quoting Secretary of State Hull, “[Russia sought to] establish outposts, bases and warm-water harbors in many areas and add buffer territories and otherwise prepare her own outward defenses.”   LaFeber also discusses an Eastern European buffer, “For Stalin the Russian “sphere” would serve as a strategic buffer against the west,” (LaFeber, 11).  LaFeber goes on to say that Stalin declared that another war was “only a matter of time” especially after Germany recovered (LaFeber, 19).
     Williams emphasized the non-aggressive nature of these intended buffers, “Russia retreated from these efforts in the face of Americas vigorous and militant opposition,” (Williams, 171).  Indeed there are European precedents for the buffer theory.  The Treaty of Versailles signed to end World War One demanded the demilitarization of the Rhineland between France and Germany as protection for France against future German aggression.  LaFeber goes further than Williams on this point emphasizing US double standards, “The Western powers tried to isolate the Soviets by creating such buffer states as Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in Eastern Europe,” (LaFeber, 3).  This would agree with Williams who points out via a quote from Henry Wallace, “We should […] judge [Russian] requirements against the background of what we ourselves and the British have insisted upon as essential to our respective security” (Williams, 171).  The United States having never suffered the continuous threat of attack and invasion that Russia had historically faced had no basis with which to understand or empathize with Russian motivation.
     Williams argues that America refused aid to Russia believing that their comparative economic and military strength would force the Soviets to capitulate to political pressures.  It was a foreshadowing of atomic diplomacy.  Indeed as Williams points out the US, “Assumed that the combination of US strength and Russian weakness would enable them to structure the postwar world according to the principles and practices of the open door policy.  American leaders interpreted the atom bomb as the final guarantee that such was possible,” (Williams, 169).
     US foreign policy and businesses paved the way for the tidal wave of revolutions mid-twentieth century by stripping countries of their own assets and exporting the profits to the US.  Williams uses the example of US oil companies bleeding Mexican oil reserves and destroying their reservoirs before abandoning them and moving on to Venezuela (Williams, 109).  Williams asserts that the US, “[Did] not [initiate] and [sustain] the balanced and equitable development of the areas into which it expanded.  When it increased the gross national product for an area […] it did so under conditions that immediately removed much of the added wealth to the United States.  Little of what remained was invested in the development of the [local] political economy,” (Williams, 200).
     LaFeber supports Williams in the above argument but he suggests that the US intervention served to antagonize the local community into a heightened sense of nationalism.  LaFeber points out that the US sending 10,000 troops to Russia to overthrow Lenin after the revolution only caused resentment in the Russian population who then flocked to Lenin’s aid.  A foreshadowing of the coming Southeast Asian crisis when US involvement prompted increases in nationalist feelings in Vietnam.
     Williams asserts that the US failed to accept culpability for its actions and the results of its adoption of the open door policy and so chose instead to view the ideological gap with Russia as one between Russia’s innate evil and Americas moral high ground.  Williams goes too far however in his emphasis in the improvement in daily life for Russians after the revolution.  Perhaps this is because the book was written in 1959 before many facts were readily available from behind the iron curtain.  Williams also suggests, “[A] review of Russian experience suggests that the sources of Russian conduct are the drives to conquer poverty and achieve basic security in the world of nation states,” while there is no doubt that is true in part it is unwise to place Russian motivation purely in these simplistic terms.
     In contrast, LaFeber although agreeing that there was a polarization of feeling during the Cold War shows that Russia was also to blame in some measure using Zhadanovs declaration of a both a pro-Russian and US dependant bloc as an illustration, (LaFeber, 70).  LaFeber also shows that there was dissention within Russia with members of Stalin’s own party urging him to soften his emphasis on war industries and focus instead on building domestic ones.
 Throughout his book Williams is critical of President Truman’s anti-Soviet bias and his immediate assertion that the world must be shaped to fit US ideals, “The Russians would soon be put in their places, and that the US would then take the lead in running the world in the way that the world ought to be run” (Williams, 168).
     LaFeber is also highly critical of Truman and Acheson.  Both he and Williams place most of the blame for the rise of the Cold War on those shoulders.  It appears to me that much of the Cold War stemmed from the US failure to compromise with Russia over the fate of Germany post World War Two.  The US wanted a strong reunified Germany in order to bolster its foreign markets while Russia needed the security of a weakened Germany as insurance against future German aggression.  The US could not or would not accept this challenge to their open door needs.
     LaFeber indirectly accuses Truman of misleading congress by manipulating the US fear of communism, saying that the Czechoslovakia crisis of 1948 was largely invented, “US officials […] concocted the scare [‘’’] to terrify congress into passing bills for a major military buildup” (LaFeber, 73).  This is only one of the many instances of Truman’s manipulation peppered throughout the text.
     The cultural imperialism implicit in both the US popular psyche, and in particular in its political philosophy is one of the major problems with US ideology.  It is also one of the main reasons that the outside world is still angry and distrustful of the United States even to this day.  Williams saw this trait as an inherent US failing, “Many Americans insist [] that other people cannot really solve their problems and improve their lives unless they go about it in the same way as the United States” (Williams, 15).    Williams argues that had the US adopted the humanitarian half of Truman’s walnut and worked without strings attached to increase the standard of living in the world at large instead of just Western Europe, the sense of desperation for a better life that led to revolution have been averted.  And the Russian people may eventually have rejected communisms centralized power structure as an unnecessary evil.  Eventually the US would have prevailed in winning the ideological war against communism without resorting to Cold War tactics.
     Williams lays the blame lays the blame completely with US policy.  He cites US refusal to negotiate Russian reparations and Eastern European stance as the basis for the polarization of the Cold War conflict, “American policy offered Russian leaders no real choice on the issues of economic aid and military security. […] The American attitude left the Russians with but one option: if they did not accept American proposals, they were confronted by American hostility” (Williams, 151).  In conjunction Williams attempts to prove that unlike accepted US thought, Stalin was indeed ready to work with America in order to guarantee aid to rebuild and improve the lot of his people.  Indeed this would not be surprising given the deplorable state of Russia’s economy both industrially and agriculturally by the end of the war.  The US however chose to ignore this opportunity to help improve conditions for the Russian people in order to try and force its own political agenda upon the rest of the world.
     LaFeber too states that Stalin was ready and willing to accept US help after World War Two.  He gives several examples of the US reneging on agreements with Russia over issues that would promote Russian security, for instance in the Dardanelles, “During the war Roosevelt and Churchill had assured Stalin that Russia was justified in having access to the Mediterranean, particularly since Turkey had collaborated with Hitler.  And again, as in Iran, by 1945 the British and Americans had changed their minds” (LaFeber, 37).
     LaFeber pointed out that the US repeatedly overestimated Russian involvement in the affairs of other countries even though they were well aware of the limitations of Russia’s economic and military capabilities.  Truman assumed that Stalin was behind Chinas involvement in Korea when that was not the case: and when the Truman Doctrine and the Theory of Containment were brought into existence Truman and his advisors did so in order to “Scare hell” out of the American people knowing full well that Russia was fifteen years from being able to enter another war.  They also knew that Russia had no interest in Western Europe unless the Western Europe showed, “Signs of ganging upon the” (LaFeber, 28).  At the same time the US was touting Soviet aggressions they themselves were giving the Soviets ample reasons for mistrust by repeatedly excluding them from negotiations and discussions and backing out of agreements
     In short Williams traces the origins of the Cold War back to the United States adoption of the open door policy and its inherent believe in its own manifest destiny.  Williams believed that the US helped to foster the growth of communism and socialism because of its cultural and moral imperialism and then polarized the world between these and its own capitalist doctrine.  Williams believed that the US did this because it feared that any doctrine different from its own would was a threat to US economic stability and the strength of its foreign markets worldwide.  The US because of its implicit belief that theirs was the only way to govern failed to find common ground with Russia in the period immediately following World War Two in order to further its own political and economic agenda.
     Williams concludes his book by advising a radical shake-up of foreign policy and an acceptance that the US reliance on the open door policy was a major cause of the Cold War.  He also advises that the US begin to dispense foreign aid because it is morally right to do so not because it will further its own economic prosperity and they should do this through the United Nations.  But, Williams emphasizes that the root of any policy rethink must be that the US accept its own ideological orientation should not prevent any other country from forming its own decisions on how best to govern itself.
     It is interesting that the US should be so vehemently opposed to the revolution and struggle in other countries given that its own political, economic and cultural life began with revolution against a colonial governing power.  The US has become so insular in its political worldview that it seeks only to further the interests of its own business community even at the expense of the right of self-determination and governance in other countries around the world.  In seeming agreement with this Williams was almost prophetic, “If clung to much longer, the policy of open-door expansion will very probably end by producing the literal isolation of the United States,” (Williams, 209).
     Williams book is amazingly relevant for todays US political climate even though it was written 43 years ago.  Many of the recommendations he makes for forward political momentum could still be applied.  However, Williams seems to lean too much toward blaming the US and does not attempt to analyze Russia’s part in the Cold Wars development causing his overall representation to be skewed.  While this almost pro-Russian outlook must have been almost revolutionary in and of itself at the time of publication it is less helpful than a more balanced analysis would now be.
     LaFeber's work by contrast, is much more balanced between the Russian and US views.  He interested me because he quoted so often from Russian sources that allowed us to see both sides of the issues involved.  Although LaFeber is far less obviously biased towards Russia, there appears to me still a decided emphasis on the culpability of Truman and Acheson as architects for the struggle between communism and capitalism.  LaFeber points out that on several occasions that US assumptions of Russian motivations were not necessarily wrong.  But in the end he still seems to share Williams’s idea that Truman and Acheson ignored several key opportunities to avert the Cold War and have open relations with Russia due to their innate distrust, whether fair or unfair, of Russian motivations.  At the root of it all for both Williams and LaFeber is US determination that capitalism is the only true way and that any threat to US foreign markets must be dealt with no matter the cost to self-determination of the country involved.
Image courtesy of the Whitehouse

Accessed Nov. 2, 2002 at www.whitehouse.gov
For Recent American History HST 212
Professor Tom DePalma Harper College
May 16, 2002		 Image courtesy of Bucknell University Russian programme

Accessed Nov. 2, 2002 at 
http://www.departments.bucknell.edu/russian
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