Fractured Court, Monumental Decision: Earl Warren's Unifying Role in Brown |
![]() Chief Justice Earl
Warren of the United States Supreme Court.
Accessed 12 April 2003 |
In the years prior to the Brown decision of 1954, the Supreme Court lacked consensus on the debate surrounding desegregation. The appointment of Earl Warren (following the death of Fred Vinson) as Chief Justice by President Eisenhower was the momentum the Court needed to achieve complete unity and depart from its fractured state in a decision with the anticipated magnitude of Brown. The unanimous verdict came at a cost, or a compromise, at the very least. The gradual ruling of Brown II was a direct result of the conciliatory nature of Brown I. This new, active role assumed by the judicial branch was displeasing to Chief Executive, Dwight D. Eisenhower. His relationship with Warren, while amicable initially, grew less so as a result of the Brown ruling.
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Primary
Question
Exactly how instrumental was the appointment of Earl Warren in securing a unanimous verdict in Brown? Warren's unusual persuasive abilities and uncanny ability to defuse tensions between the divided members of his Court certainly aided in his securing an unanimous verdict. His alliance with the legal strategies proposed by Justice Felix Frankfurter further enabled the Court's solidarity. His commitment to the belief that a deeply divided Court "would have been catastrophic" provided the necessary guidance in the ruling which declared "separate but equal is inherently unequal" and ended the life of Jim Crow.
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![]() Brown II (1955) called for "all deliberate speed"
in the desegregation of public schools. It left the power to implement
the ruling primarily in the hands of the lower courts and local school
officials.
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(1) To what extent did the unanimity in Brown I shape the corresponding verdict of Brown II? The foundation of Brown II is Frankfurter's gradual notion of "all deliberate speed" in the implementation of desegregation. Warren and the other justices supported his idea for several reasons. First, the Court feared that an immediate ruling on enforcement would cause chaos in the South. In addition, Brown II served to alleviate the concerns of the justices who feared the Court's inability to enforce its own ruling might discredit the judicial process. Warren's rationale for passing responsibility to the district courts and local school districts was justified by his belief that "they were closer to the problems involved."
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(2) To what degree did the relationship between Eisenhower and Warren change or evolve as a result of the Brown ruling? The two met for the first time in 1952 at the Republican National Convention under a pretense of mutual respect. Warren had helped Eisenhower gained the presidential nomination by working to seat some pro-Eisenhower delegates. As a respected reform governor, Warren fit the bill for Chief Justice. Eisenhower wanted a man of “national stature” and one under the age of 62. Initially, Eisenhower admitted he had “long respected” Warren despite the concern of some about Warren’s political philosophies. Post-Brown, Eisenhower expressed neither “approbation nor disapproval of the Court decision,” but a closer examination yields some definite tension between the two, especially as the years progress. The two were politicians, however, and masked their dislike for one another in public. |
President Eisenhower
once said his appointment of Earl Warren as Chief Justice was the "biggest
damn fool mistake." He presumably never imagined the Court would
become more "liberalized" under Warren's leadership.
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